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This  work  studies  how  different  social  mobilisation  processes  have  influenced  policy 
processes  in  Latin  America  (2000-2003)  and  vice  versa.  Studying  these  interrelations 
includes three issues of empirical and theoretical importance. First, it explores under what 
conditions  an  investment  project  or  policy  initiative  that  is  strongly  supported  by  a 
democratically elected government on the basis of economic and technical arguments may 
trigger the emergence of a social movement; and under what conditions a social movement 
may successfully preclude the implementation of such project or policy initiative. Second, 
this work explores if these social movements have actually compensated for the absence of 
channels of participation and representation that work to influence the institutional policy 
process. Third and final, it studies if the influence and impact of these social movements 
have  contributed  to  improve  the  design  and  implementation  of  public  policies  in  the 
medium term and to promote the democratic consolidation in the region.   Although  the 
work is based on evidence from many countries in the region, there are mainly two case 
studies presented with more detail: the ‘Water War’ in Cochabamba, Bolivia (2001-2002) 
and the conflict triggered by the project to build a new airport in Mexico City (2001-
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This work pursues three main objectives. First, it explores the interrelations between social 
movements and public policy in Latin America. For this purposes it leaves aside the study 
of social movements that contributed to democratic transitions in the region during the 
1980s and focuses on social movements that have emerged with more frequency in the last 
ten years. These latter have emerged in the context of electorate democracies that have 
been recently reinstalled and as a response to projects and public policies promoted by 
governments that were elected legitimately in the ballots.  
  In other words, the object of study does not constitute, for example, the urban 
popular movements that supported the Frente Democrático Nacional (FDN) in Mexico in 
1988, urban movements of Brazil or human rights movements that were so important for 
the  democratisation  processes  of  Argentina  and  Brazil  during  this  same  decade.  By 
contrast, this paper is centred on social movements such as the one that was led by the 
Frente Popular en Defensa de la Tierra (FPDT), whose main goal was to oppose the 
construction of a new international airport in Mexico City (NIAMC) in year 2002; the 
Coordinadora del Agua y de la Vida (CAV), organised against the privatisation of water 
and sanitation in the city of Cochabamba, Bolivia in year 2000 or the Coordinadora del 
Gas (CG), organised against a project to export gas from Bolivia to Mexico and the United 
States via Chile.  
   There  are  important  differences  regarding  the  economic,  political,  and  social 
context in which each of these movements emerged and the public policies under study are 
varied and heterogeneous. However, these case studies can be studied together under the 
premise that there is a storyline with similar ingredients: 1) an infrastructure project or a 
public policy associated with the implementation or management of infrastructure projects 
that is promoted by a democratically elected government; 2) social groups that mobilise to 
oppose and reject such initiative; 3) a discourse that frames the project in the context of 
broader social and political demands; and finally, 4) the ‘triumph’ of contentious groups 
which accomplish the cancellation of the project and trigger social and political changes 
that surpass the project or public policy itself; often with important implications for the 
stability and governance of a democratic regime.  
 More concretely, the main question underpinning the work of this paper is: how 
and why a political mobilisation can successfully oppose a public policy or investment 
project that is strongly supported by a democratically elected government on the basis of 
economic and technical arguments? The answer to this question is relevant from both a 
practical and theoretical point of view. From a theoretical point of view there is a deficit in 
the literature that explores systematically the ways in which different social movement 
dynamics may impinge upon the outcomes of public policies and vice versa, the ways in 
which  the  implementation  of  certain  public  policies  may  trigger  the  emergence  and 
evolvement of contentious groups that organise successfully against this sort of initiatives. 
In a few words, to make sense of these case studies it is necessary to build a conceptual 
framework that combines different social movement theories with different theories that 
have been produced in the area of public policy in the last twenty years.  
From a practical point of view, in the next decades Latin America will face the 
challenge of meeting an ever increasing deficit of infrastructure whose materialisation will 
require intense and complicated negotiations between different public, private, and social 
actors. As an example –the one that is best known by the author-, in the case of Mexico a 
number of infrastructure projects have already been identified as a top priority to sustain 
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calculations  the  necessary  investment  could  reach  USD  60  billions  in  a  twenty  years 
horizon (Elías Ayub, 2005). That is, in the following two decades it will be necessary to 
negotiate  the  implementation  of  projects  whose  investment  requirements  may  be 
equivalent  to  twenty  airports  similar  to  the  one  that  was  supposed  to  be  built  in  the 
outskirts of Mexico City in year 2002. And yet, the record to date is not very encouraging. 
In the last ten years, the country has witnessed the cancellation or indefinite postponement 
of almost twenty projects, from tourist developments and housing projects to dams and 
road  expansions  (Reforma,  08-09-03).  If  this  data  is  extrapolated  to  the case  of  Latin 
America overall, we would be taking of a very conservative figure of USD 200 billions in 
a twenty years time frame. These projects should be considered in addition to structural 
reforms of a bigger magnitude that will require complex negotiations and changes in the 
methods and parameters that are used to assess the implementation of new projects and 
public policies. 
Based on this analysis, the present work also explores some relations between this 
kind of social movements and the processes of democratic consolidation in the region. For 
this purpose it is necessary to raise two questions. First, to what extent have these social 
movements compensated for the unequal access to channels of political representation and 
participation in Latin America? And second, beyond the cancellation and/or postponement 
of infrastructure projects in the short term, what have been the medium and long-term 
effects of these social mobilisations on the processes of democratic consolidation and on 
the design and instrumentation of new public policies in general?  
 Third and finally, the paper closes with suggestions for a future research agenda. 
As argued in the last sections, this task should result in at least two products: 1) a more 
sophisticated conceptual framework that is based on a multidisciplinary approach and that 
extends our  understanding of the interrelations between democracy, public policy, and 
social movements; and 2) a series of guidelines to improve the institutional processes for 
assessing and implementing infrastructure projects and the public policies associated with 
these latter.  
The rest of this work is divided as follows. Section II presents a brief description of 
the two case studies on which this work is based. Section III suggests two conceptual 
frameworks that could be adapted to study the public policy process in Latin America, 
including the conditions under which a democratic government decides to promote certain 
infrastructure project, even when not all the social and political difficulties are tied up. In 
this regard, there are two key concepts: the opening of windows of opportunity and the 
attempts  to establish and/or  to  consolidate  decision-making  monopolies.  Based  on this 
analysis, Section IV examines in more depth the role that dominant normative values play 
during the conception, design, and survival of a project on the policy agenda. Section V 
resorts to social movement theories –more specifically to the analysis of collective action 
frames  projected  by  a  social  movement-  to  explain  the  conditions  under  which  the 
opposition to an infrastructure project may be successful. Section VI analyses the issue of 
the ‘autistic State’ and explores the relations between the legitimacy of a social movement 
in the public sphere and the endorsement of public policies based on a limited number of 
normative values and assessment criteria. Finally, Section VII analyses the implications of 
both dynamics –public policies and social mobilisations- for the processes of democratic 
consolidation in the region and Section VIII presents some suggestions to be considered 
for a future research agenda.  
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II. GENERAL BACKGROUND: PUBLIC POLICY AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 
IN MEXICO AND BOLIVIA 
 
 
The  project  for  a  new airport  in  Mexico  City  was  promoted  by  the  administration  of 
President Vicente Fox in the years of 2001 and 2002. This project had been on and off the 
governmental  agenda  for  more  than  three  decades  and  its  implementation  had  been 
discarded and/or postponed by the five presidents previous to Vicente Fox. According to 
the  official  version,  the  site  for  the  project  was  chosen  on  the  basis  of  its  technical-
aeronautical advantages, cost-benefit analysis, minimisation of environmental impacts, and 
opportunities for socio-economic development. Moreover, the new airport was conceived 
as one of the most important projects of the new democratically elected government; a 
government that had been democratically elected after seventy years of hegemony by the 
Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI). 
  The main obstacle, however, was the necessity to expropriate 5,391 hectares of 
ejidos  and  displace  4,375  landowners  who  live  in  the  municipalities  of  Atenco  and 
Texcoco, in the outskirts of Mexico City. Nearly one year after the public announcement, 
the resettlement and expropriation negotiations failed and opposition to the project led to 
violent  and  non-violent  mobilisations  from  several  groups  -peasants,  NGOs,  political 
parties, and even groups  that were  not directly affected.  The  project was cancelled in 
August of 2002 and to date there is no alternative project to solve the serious problems of 
traffic capacity that the International Airport of Mexico City faces.  
  In a similar fashion, the privatisation of water and sanitation services (WSS) in 
Cochabamba, Bolivia was promoted by the government of Hugo Banzer and backed by 
international  financial  institutions  in  the  year  2000.  Such  scheme  was  implemented 
through a concession awarded to Aguas del Tunari (AdT) -a private consortium backed by 
Bechtel International. The respective contract was tied to the implementation of a ‘multiple 
development project’  called the MISICUNI-Multiple Project (MMP), which included the 
construction  of  a  dam  to  increase  the  supply  of  drinkable  water  in  urban  areas  of 
Cochabamba and water for irrigation in surrounding rural areas. For many decades the 
MMP had been conceived as one of the main projects to foster the development in the 
whole department of Cochabamba. 
  However, the main obstacles were the need to increase water fees to make the 
MMP feasible and to change existing regulations to allow the privatisation of WSS in the 
country. In both cases, these measures led to social and political tensions that derived in 
street protests from different urban and rural actors claiming that the government colluded 
with private actors to exploit water resources without benefiting the most disadvantaged 
and without respecting traditional uses and customs in rural areas. Under heavy political 
and social pressures, the concession of WSS to AdT was revoked in May 2000 and the 
MMP was indefinitely postponed.   




III.  PUBLIC  POLICY:  WINDOWS  OF  OPPORTUNITY  AND  DECISION-
MAKING MONOPOLIES 
  
There are two questions that arise from the two case studies that were described in the last 
section.  First,  why  did  government  actors  promote  projects  and  public  policies,  even 
though not all the possible social and political difficulties were tied up?  And second, what 
were  the  main  official  arguments,  claims,  and  legitimacy  discourses  employed  by  the 
respective institutional actors in charge of promoting such projects and public policies? 
  A rational approach to public policy is too simplistic to answer these questions. It 
is inadequate a conception of such process as a lineal and systematic process through 
which  a)  a  problem  emerges,  b)  is  comprehensively  analysed  to  determine  available 
solutions,  and  c)  the  best  one  is  chosen  according  to  strictly  economic  and  technical 
parameters (Chart 1). In contrast, a detailed analysis of the stories behind the project for a 
new airport in Mexico City, the ‘Water War’ in Cochabamba, Bolivia, or the ‘Gas War’ in 
this same country show that sudden policy changes such as the decision to go ahead with 
an infrastructure project that has been delayed for many decades and/or that faces overt 
social and political opposition are best explained by using other theoretical concepts. Two 
examples are the concept of windows of opportunity proposed by John Kingdon (1984) 
and the concept of punctuated-equilibrium proposed by Baumgartner and Jones (1993).   
  Kingdon (1984) proposes a system of interactions on the basis of four streams: 
actors,  problems,  policies,  and  politics.  Although  these  streams  may  sometimes  be 
interconnected they usually evolve independently from each other. The main premise is 
that an issue reaches the policy agenda –for example, the construction of a new airport- 
when  a  problem,  a  policy  solution,  and  someone  willing  to  advance  it  –a  policy 
entrepreneur- coincide in time and open a policy window (Chart 1). In other words, the 
convergence between these four streams opens a window of opportunity in one or many 
policy areas. The forecasting capacity of this model is very limited. However, in contrast 
with a model of lineal decisions, the analytical categories proposed by this conceptual 
frame are more capable of explaining –even if in hindsight- the existence not only of 
problems looking for solutions but of solutions looking for problems.    
Baumgartner and Jones (1993) propose a division of actors involved in the design 
and implementation of public policies according to two main groups: policy subsystems 
and macro-political institutions such as the Congress or the Presidency.
2 The first group is 
composed by academics, technical experts, consultants, and other professionals in charge 
of the design and technical assessment of public policies. They are usually actors that 
remain hidden, away from the limelight and the public scene. The second group are often 
more  visible,  they  have  more  political  power,  and  enjoy  greater  decision-making 
attributions  regarding  the  content  and  timing  of  the  policy  agenda.  According  to 
Baumgartner and Jones, these latter can only process a limited number of issues at a time 
and therefore there are many issues that remain within ‘policy communities’ and out of the 
political spotlight. In the long term, these small communities tend to build and protect 
decision-making monopolies within certain policy area(s).  
                                                
2 Kingdon (1984:68) proposes a similar division of actors, but he classifies them according to the 
‘non-visible cluster’ (those engaged in generating the policy agenda) and the ‘visible cluster’ (those 
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The stability of these monopolies depends on the creation of barriers, including the 
projection  of  a  positive  image  in  the  public  sphere  (Hunt,  2002:74),  to  block  the 
intromission of other actors (Hunt, 2002:74). Such image is usually based on a concrete 
and narrow definition of problems which limits the number of conflict dimensions and 
thwarts  the  problematisation  of  public  policies.  It  is  often  possible  to  find  that  such 
dominant policy image is based on a one-dimensional definition of problems, even when 
these are in reality multidimensional (Baumgartner and Jones, 2002: 21). In this  way, 
actors with access to these monopolies are able to guarantee that their decision-making 
power is not questioned by external actors and more importantly, that issues related with 
their area of expertise are not moved up to the agenda of macro-political institutions. The 
concept of a punctuated-equilibrium is used to describe changes in the policy agenda, 
consequence of positive images that collapse and that in other circumstances would help 
the shielding, isolation, and survival of decision-making monopolies.
3  
  Both  conceptual  frameworks,  the  multiple  streams  framework  (MSF)  and  the 
punctuated-equilibrium theory (PET), were conceived to explain policy processes in the 
United States, a country with a longer liberal-democratic tradition compared to the Latin 
American cases  and whose policy systems are generally more decentralised and  open, 
conducive  to  the  innovation  and  competition  between  different  policy  alternatives. 
However,  with the proper adjustments and considerations both conceptual frameworks 
may be combined to provide with the heuristic tools and analytical categories that are 
useful  for  studying  ‘recurrent  causal  mechanisms’  (Tilly,  2002:2)      behind  the  policy 
agendas of Latin American countries.  
   Moreover,  as  explained  throughout  this  work  both  models  open  the  door  for 
considering the role that social movements and contentious groups may have in the policy 
process. For example, they can introduce new dimensions of conflict or make them more 
salient,  preventing  then  the  consolidation  of  new  policy  monopolies  and/or  prompting 
institutional actors to reconsider whether or not there is actually a window of opportunity. 
At  the  same  time,  the  study  of  the  policy  process  through  a  holistic  approach  –i.e. 
considering together the role of actors, institutions, ideas, and socioeconomic scenarios-, in 
combination with social movement theories facilitates the identification of problems and 
challenges associated with the consolidation of third wave democracies in Latin America. 
As  argued  at  the  end  of  this  work,  the  most  evident  challenge  is  the  lack  of  policy 
instruments that contribute to democratising the public space in a practical and functional 
manner.   
   In the case of Mexico, the possibility that the capacity of the International Airport 
of Mexico City (IAMC) would be exceeded in the near future appeared intermittently on 
the  presidential  agenda  between  1976  and  2000.  What  is  more,  this  problem  often 
coincided  with  the  availability  of  policy  solutions  that  had  evolved  according  to  the 
dynamics  inherent  to  the  policy  stream  –i.e.  according  to  specialised  studies,  existing 
technical limitations, and prevailing normative values. Unfortunately, the existence of a 
                                                
3 The classic example documented by these authors is that of nuclear power for civilian uses in the 
United States (Baumgartner y Jones, 1991). Between 1944 and the late 1960s the use of nuclear 
power for civilian purposes was accompanied by a policy discourse emphasising the benefits of 
this technology in terms of efficiency and technical progress. During this period the regulation and 
monitoring of nuclear energy was in the hands of one single governmental agency –the Atomic 
Energy Commission (AEC), which enjoyed a close monopoly that prevented other government and 
non-government actors from scrutinising its activities. Nevertheless, this changed drastically since 
the late  1960s  when  other  actors  successfully introduced new  conflict  dimensions,  replacing a 
positive image based on the ideas of ‘progress and efficiency’ by a negative image based on the 
ideas of ‘risk and danger’. QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS145  Page 8 
 
 
problem and the availability of feasible solutions are not always sufficient conditions for a 
project to get the final push and to move up in the priorities of the executive power. At the 
end of the day, five presidents previous to Vicente Fox (2000-2006) decided to postpone 
indefinitely the construction of a new airport. In this respect, the crucial difference was the 
victory of an opposition party in the presidential elections of the year 2000 after seventy 
one years of uninterrupted PRI’s ruling. Such political transition was very important, not 
because the problems and restrictions of the policy process changed but because the Fox 
administration  enjoyed  the  legitimacy  and  political  solvency  necessary  to  promote  an 
infrastructure  project  of  such  magnitude.  In  these  circumstances,  the  NIAMC  could 
potentially be the main and most important infrastructure project of the presidential six-
year term. In a few words, year 2000 witnessed the opening of a window of opportunity as 
defined by the MSF: the airport capacity problems were imminent, there was a feasible 
solution that had been studied for many years, the political setting seemed conducive, and 
there was a set of actor willing to promote the project for the sake of their own political 
legitimacy.  
 As Kingdon (1984) points out, the problem is that windows of opportunity do not 
remain  open  for  long  and  policy  makers  should  move  swiftly  if  they  want  to  take 
advantage. However, in the context of a policy process that is imperfect and problematic, 
with new participation spaces opened up by the processes of democratisation, and with a 
new distribution of political power it is almost impossible to reach unanimous consensus 
in the short term. The combination of these two factors – the likelihood that the window of 
opportunity  closes  and  difficulty  to  reach  a  consensus-  implies  a  dilemma  for  policy 
makers:  postponing  a  project  to  build  the  necessary  consensus,  losing  the  window  of 
opportunity or proceeding with the project, even when not all the potential difficulties are 
tied up. The case studies seem to confirm that the second case has been most common in 
Latin America. In the context of a window of opportunity, those who promote projects and 
public policies in democratic regimes are often forced to go ahead even when unexpected -
and often undesirable- outcomes are likely to appear.  
For example, in the Mexican case the idea that the first opposition government 
enjoyed unconditional support distorted the government’s decisions regarding the NIAMC. 
In  a few  words, the  Fox administration believed  that  the  discourse of democracy  was 
enough to sort out all the obstacles, including the displacement of population, the financial 
limitations  to  compensate  the  affected  communities,  and  the  presence  of  important 
institutional  actors  who  were  manifestly  against  the  project;
  4  all  these  on  top  of  the 
unforeseen  –and  unforeseeable-  difficulties  because  the  policy  process  is  inherently 
imperfect. But it is precisely the democratic transition that made the negotiation with other 
political  forces  at  all  levels  so  important  for  the  successful  implementation  of  such  a 
complex and controversial project. 
The Pacific-LNG project, promoted by the Bolivian government in year 2003 to 
export natural gas to Mexico and the Untied States via Chile represents a similar example. 
In this case, the election of Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada (GSL) as president of Bolivia 
together with other events in the policy and the politics streams brought about the opening 
of a window of opportunity that -at least from the point of view of GSL’s government- 
could not be missed out.  
                                                
4 A detailed analysis of the institutional actors show the existence of two advocacy coalitions: those 
in  favour  of  locating  the  airport  in  Texcoco,  constituted  by  public  servants  of  the  ministry  of 
transport  and  communications,  the  Government  of  the  State  of  Mexico,  and  the  municipal 
government  of Atenco,  between other  actors;  and  those  in  favour of  locating  the  airport in  an 
alternative  site  –Tizayuca-,  constituted  by  the  Government  of  the  State  of  Hidalgo  and  the 
Government of the Federal District, between other actors.  QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS145  Page 9 
 
 
Already between 1993 and 1997 GSL had been a strong promoter of private sector 
participation in different economic sectors of Bolivia, including strategic sectors such as 
hydrocarbons and mining. In fact, a controversial law that granted foreign companies the 
property rights of natural gas once extracted from the underground was approved during 
his first mandate in 1996   (Ley de Hidrocarburos, 1996). With this background, it was 
expected that the election of GSL would be accompanied with a greater governmental 
willingness to promote a project to commercialise the natural gas reserves that had been 
probed and certified in the late 1990s (Domínguez, 2005: 7). 
The second mandate of GSL also coincided with other events that signalled the 
opening of a window of opportunity in year 2003. One of the most important was the crisis 
of natural gas supply that the United States experienced one year earlier. When this crisis 
was accompanied by public declarations of key figures favouring the imports of natural 
gas
5  and  by  changes  in laws  to ease  the  installation  of  import  terminals,  it  became a 
concrete  global  opportunity  to  secure  a  market  and  monetise  the  Bolivian  natural  gas 
internationally.  Such  opportunity  was  not  trivial  considering  that  natural  gas  projects 
involve capital investments that are only possible when the market is secured through 
long-term  contracts,  of  at  least  fifteen  years.  In  the  absence  of  such  contracts,  the 
monetisation of natural gas is not possible, no matter the amount of certified reserves and 
whatever  feasible  projects  exist  or  not.  In  this  way,  2002  seemed  to  offer  a  valuable 
opportunity  that  should  be  used  swiftly  before  other  global  competitors  could  secure 
favourable contracts to export natural gas to the United States (ibid. 8).  
  But again, in the context of a policy process that is problematic and imperfect and 
with a new distribution of political power, windows of opportunity that are used without 
the necessary consensus may become very costly. For many reasons, such consensus was 
particularly difficult in the Bolivian case: a) in his previous mandate, Sánchez de Lozada 
had  promoted  other  failed  experiments  to  capitalise  the  hydrocarbons  sector;  b)  the 
governing coalition was formed overnight to win the 2002 elections and it was not strong 
enough;
6 c) the political parties that had been excluded by this coalition enjoyed enough 
support  to  oppose  any  governmental  initiative;  and  d)  the  repression  of  social 
mobilisations at the beginning of 2003 and the unwillingness of the president to give any 
concessions,  destroyed  the  little  sympathy  and  legitimacy  that  the  government  had  to 
promote any ambitious project.
7  
Building a consensus appeared to be almost impossible or in any case it implied a 
complicated  process  of  bargaining  with  other  political  forces  and  to  accommodate 
disparate vested interests. The process would take long, even years, as demonstrated by the 
sequel of reforms and negotiations that have continued for almost four years after the 
ousting of GSL and that have carried on during Evo Morales’ mandate –even though the 
Pacific-LNG project has now been completely discarded from the policy agenda.  The 
problem is that windows of opportunity do not remain open for long and therefore the final 
decision between promoting an infrastructure project or not is necessarily the result of an 
inexact calculation based on the available information, the cognitive experience of policy 
makers, and the normative values that prevail throughout the process. For example, in the 
                                                
5 The most important was the declaration of Alan Greenspan during a congressional testimony in June of 
2003, calling for ‘a major expansion of LNG terminal import capacity’ (Greenspan, 10-Jun-03, cited in 
Congressional Research Service, 2004) 
6 Under the Bolivian electoral laws, if no candidate wins with an absolute majority in the first round, the 
president should be elected by the Congress in a second round.   
7 These mobilisations emerged against a new tax on wages that was part of a fiscal adjustment plan promoted 
by the IMF. At the beginning of his mandate, Sanchez de Lozada enjoyed rates of approval of 46% but one 
year later such rates fell to 30% (Vegas, 2003).  QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS145  Page 10 
 
 
case  of  the  ‘Gas  War’  in  Bolivia  it  seems  that  GSL’s  administration  overvalued  the 
prevailing market opportunities and the need to secure a long-term contract to sell natural 
gas to the United States; and underestimated the national mood and the distribution of 
political forces, including the emergence of opposing advocacy coalitions.  The premise 
was to take advantage of the policy window, even if not all the potential difficulties were 
foreseen and well tied up (Domínguez, 2005: 8).  
A third example is the so-called ‘Water War’ which took place in Cochabamba, 
Bolivia in the year 2000. In this concrete case, the problems stream can be summarised in 
three interrelated components. Firstly, the region faces the challenge of finding a source of 
water supply that is reliable and sustainable in the long-term; the competition between 
urban and rural uses of water makes this task especially urgent. Secondly, it is necessary to 
have a water enterprise that is financially, technically, and administratively healthier so 
that it is able to pay for the water and to distribute it in the urban area of Cochabamba 
(Justiniano, 03-08-05; Los Tiempos, 10-08-96). Third and finally, the distribution of water 
should  also  meet  higher  parameters  of  social  equality  in  the  access  to  water.  These 
problems  have  been  present  for  more  than  fifty  years,  but  they  became  particularly 
pertinent during the 1970s and 1980s when the city of Cochabamba became an important 
recipient of migratory flows, consequence of three factors: a) the shutting down of mining 
centres in other regions, b) the economic absorption facilitated by commerce and services 
activities in the city of Cochabamba, and c) the booming production of coca leaves in the 
Chapare.  The  resulting  population  growth  has  been  translated  into  an  excessive  and 
disorderly urban expansion that has surpassed the technical and administrative capacity of 
the municipal provider of water and sanitation.  
  In this context, the main policy solution that has been advanced to cover the water 
deficit in Cochabamba is the MISICUNI multiple project. Its history goes back fifty years 
in time and its main components are a dam and a tunnel for transporting the reservoirs of 
the  River  Misicuni  and  other  rivers  located  20  Km  away  from  the  Central  Valley  of 
Cochabamba.  The project’s core technical parameters were already defined since 1975 
(Rico,  21-09-05)  and  the  project  appeared  on  and  off  on  the  policy  agenda,  but  its 
implementation was never officially announced before year 2000. Only then a number of 
factors coincided, signalling the existence of a window of opportunity. 
In the problems stream, the water deficit worsened in the context of more frequent 
droughts and the increasing competition between rural and urban uses of water during the 
1990s which culminated in the ‘War of the Wells’. These latter were a series of conflicts 
between authorities promoting the perforation of wells to extract underground water in 
rural areas as means of satisfying the ever growing urban demand and rural communities 
expressing  their  opposition  to  this  sort  of  policy  (Presencia,  21/02/95;  Los  Tiempos, 
8/02/98). At the same time, in the policy stream, the proposal to lease SEMAPA and 
MISICUNI jointly to attract private investments and the availability of funds for the first 
phase of the project seemed an opportunity to solve at once the three main problems in the 
WSS. And finally, in the actors and politics streams he election of ex-dictator Banzer –
who had always been a strong advocate of the MMP- in the presidential elections of 1997 
coincided  with  the  mandate  of  a  mayor  in  Cochabamba  who  had  already  positioned 
himself as a supporter of the same project. Altogether, these factors seemed to indicate that 
in year 2000 there was a window of opportunity that could not be missed out. 
Unfortunately,  leasing  MISICUNI-SEMAPA  in  year  2000  was  not  possible 
without offering conditions and concessions to private investors which were unsustainable 
from a social and political point of view. First, it was necessary to make changes in the 
Bolivian  law,  affecting  alternative  systems  of  water  provision,  which  had  emerged  as 
second-best  solutions  to  the  limited  coverage  of  SEMAPA’s  network,  and  affecting QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS145  Page 11 
 
 
traditional systems of water management in rural areas, based on uses and customs (García 
et al, 2003:42-43). Second, there were two main alternatives to get the resources necessary 
to  build  MISICUNI’s  dam  and  to  increase  the  service  coverage:  to  complement  the 
concession with public subsidies or to compensate for the financial differential with a raise 
of  water  fees.  As  explained  in  the  following  section,  given  that  fiscal  discipline  has 




IV. Normative Values and Dimensions of Conflict in the Policy Process 
 
The existence of feasibility criteria and normative values that condition the survival of 
policy  initiatives  in  the  policy  agenda  is  a  decisive  factor  in  the  policy  stream;  they 
determine if a project is implemented, discarded definitely, or postponed temporarily. In 
other  words,  it  is  possible  to  talk  about  the  ‘natural  selection  of  ideas’  (Kingdon, 
1984:125-127): a struggle between arguments and images that do not appear from one day 
to the other, but evolve over time and according to broader social, economic, and political 
contexts.  There are at least three important criteria for a proposal to survive in the policy 
agenda: feasibility criteria, value acceptability, and the anticipation of future constraints 
and obstacles (idem: 132-138).   
   For example, regarding its technical feasibility any project involving the extraction, 
transportation, liquefaction, or regasification of natural gas depends on the safety levels 
that  can  be  guaranteed  and  the  risk  levels  that  are  considered  acceptable.  It  is  not 
surprising to find that projects are often suspended or cancelled because of safety concerns 
by  nearby  populations  (Domínguez,  2005:6).  In  a  similar fashion,  the operation  of an 
airport is a matter of minimising the risk of an accident and guaranteeing the safety of 
millions of passengers. The right location is a function of highly complex variables such as 
wind direction and intensity, surrounding mountain elevations, proximity of other nearby 
airports, required landing and take-off trajectories, and topographical specificities, between 
other variables (López-Meyer, 2003).  
The  criterion  of  technical  feasibility  is  not  sufficient  to  conclude  about  the 
convenience  of  an  infrastructure  project  with  environmental,  social,  political,  and 
economic  implications  that  are  highly  complex.  Nevertheless,  there  is  a  tendency  to 
obviate other aspects when evaluating policy proposals between other reasons because the 
technical  aspects  should  be  considered  beforehand  (Vanderburg,  2000).  Following  the 
airport  example,  interviews  with  different  public  servants  confirm  this  practice.  When 
asked  about  the  parameters  that  were  taken  into  account  to  evaluate  the  airport,  the 
technical dimension was mentioned much more than the social and the political ones, at 
least comparatively (Domínguez, 2004:50). 
The second condition for the survival of an idea is its value acceptability (Kingdon, 
1984:132). That is, a project may be acceptable or not depending on prevailing normative 
values and policy principles such as equity, efficiency, or the environment. For example, 
fiscal discipline has become a decisive normative value for the survival of ideas in the 
policy agendas of Latin American governments in the last decades. Public expenditure -
especially for investment in infrastructure- has been constrained, and all major policy goals 
are now subordinated to attaining an acceptable governmental deficit.  And even when a 
project  is  not  significant  relative  to  macroeconomic  numbers,  the  sole  possibility  of 




   The NIAMC  in the Mexican  case, the Pacific-LNG  project in Bolivia, and  the 
MISICUNI project in this same country are not exceptions. In the first case, one of the 
reasons that kept Texcoco as a  possible location on  the  agenda was the possibility of 
financing the project with long-term concessions to private investors in the existing IAMC 
area and in general, because there was little doubt of the project’s future potential to attract 
private investment. However, there was still a problem of financial engineering. Although 
the existing IAMC represented an opportunity to finance part of the new airport in the 
long-term  and  the  financial  fundamentals  would  allow  a  long-term  compensation  that 
exceeded the original offer (anonymous interview, 08-2005), such resources would not be 
available during the first phases of the project; and therefore it faced budget constraints in 
the short run. This problem of ‘financial timing’ was crucial for the decision that the ‘best’ 
way to launch the project was to expropriate the necessary land and offer a long-term 
compensation for displaced people, instead of buying the land according to its commercial 
price and expected future use. 
There was a similar situation in the case of SEMAPA-MISICUNI. In the short 
term,  under  the  pressure  of  international  agencies  and  in  the  context  of  budgetary 
constraints and new normative values such as fiscal discipline, the Banzer administration 
decided not to implement a cross-subsidy scheme that would help to avoid the rise of fees, 
at least until  the service and the coverage of the network were improved significantly 
(Brockman, 08-2005). As explained in subsequent sections, such fee increases became one 
of the main grievances that provided the social movement led by the Coordinadora with 
enough cohesion.    
In general, this sort of normative values or policy principles are closely related to 
the diffusion of policy images and policy discourses that provide causal stories and that 
simplify and reduce reality to scales that are intellectually manageable (Dryzek, 1997:80-
81). In this way, policy-makers define under what conditions a project may survive in the 
policy agenda and justify –publicly and for themselves- why some value dimensions are 
more  important  than  others.  Beyond  its  technical  feasibility,  changes  in  ideas  and/or 
normative values may bring about radical adjustments on the nature of public policies.  
 For example, MISICUNI’s final design was only concluded in 1973 (Pareja, 26-
09-05).  Being  the  1970s,  in  the  context  of  fashionable  ideas  such  as  ‘integral  rural 
development’  and  the  ‘green  revolution’,  it  is  not  surprising  that  MISICUNI  was 
conceived as a project with ‘multiple’ purposes. The main goal of the project was not only 
to solve the water scarcity in the metropolitan area of Cochabamba, but to promote big 
scale  agriculture,  produce  electricity  to  facilitate  industrial  activities,  foster  economic 
development,  and  transform  the  department  of  Cochabamba  into  a  regional  economic 
enclave that would bridge the development of the Eastern tropical areas and the Bolivian 
High-Plateau. It was conceived when normative values such as ‘food self-sufficiency’, 
‘maximisation of food production’, and ‘articulation of traditional rural communities to the 
market’ were strong in the agenda of international agencies (Escobar, 1995:158-159).  
But these ideas changed after the debt crisis that began in the early 1980s. The 
adverse  economic  circumstances  brought  about  the  diffusion  of  values  that  had  been 
traditionally  endorsed  by  actors  in  the  private  sector,  such  as  economy,  efficiency, 
profitability,  and  effectiveness  (Peters  and  Wright,  1996:628-629).  In  the  case  of 
MISICUNI, the magnitude of the project was simply inconsistent with new normative 
values  such  that  began  to  dominate  the  policy  agenda.  Already  in  1991,  external 
consultants  and  representatives  from  international  agencies  had  changed  their  minds 
regarding the project’s economic and financial feasibility (Lopez, 13-09-05). In some cases 
the  advice  was  to  completely  discard  the  project from  the  government  agenda  and  in QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS145  Page 13 
 
 
others,  to adjust it so that it could be implemented in  three successive phases,  giving 
priority to the provision of drinkable water. The Banzer administration was at a crossroads. 
On one hand, the attraction of private investors would fail and a number of credits from 
different international donors could be cancelled if the project was not in line with new 
normative values. But on the other hand, there was a strong social and political pressure to 
keep  MISICUNI  unchanged,  as  a  project  with  multiple  development  purposes  and 
therefore, adjusting and reducing its magnitude would undermine its public acquiescence. 
At the end, the Banzer administration and other promoters of the project opted for an 
intermediate solution that did not contribute to avoid any of these two difficulties and the 
results were disastrous: increasing water fees, unsustainable conditions and concessions 
offered to private investors, and widespread social discontent that derived in a strong and 
vigorous social movement (Dominguez, 2006: 13-14).    
The NIAMC presents a similar story. Originally, the project of Texcoco survived in 
the policy agenda during the 1980s for its aeronautical and engineering feasibility. But 
during the last two decades, the environment became ‘visible’ (Dryzek, 1997:14; Escobar, 
1995:192-211) in the policy arena and dictated new normative values, helping to reshape 
the concept of technical feasibility.  This change caused Presidents Salinas (1988-1994) 
and Zedillo (1994-2000) to hesitate in choosing Texcoco. The uncertainties were cleared 
up when new technical studies and new comparative analyses were published in year 2001. 
Such  studies constituted an additional element of the  window  of opportunity that  was 
described above (Section III). Nevertheless, the third condition for the survival of an idea 
on the policy agenda is related to the anticipation of future constraints and obstacles during 
its  implementation.  One  of  the  most  important  is  the  public  acquiescence  to  a  policy 
(Kingdon, 1984:138). In the same way that adjustments to the MISICUNI project were not 
acceptable  from  a  social  and  political  point  of  view,  the  technical  feasibility  and  the 
comparative  advantages  of  the  airport  in  Texcoco  did  not  guarantee  that  the  project’s 
environmental impacts and population displacement were acceptable to public opinion in 
Mexico.  
 In this context, based on official documents and interviews with ex-public servants 
it seems that the strategy of the Federal Government and other actors advocating Texcoco 
was  to  stress  the  advantages  of  the  project  beyond  the  aeronautical  dimension.  The 
discourse  changed  the  Texcoco  from  being  a  ‘mere  airport’  with  socio-economic  and 
environmental impacts that should be compensated, into an ‘integral development project’, 
understood  as  an  attempt  to  comprehensively  plan  long-term  social  and  economic 
transformations (Ferguson, 1990: 11-17).  Suddenly, it was not only a solution to satisfy 
the air traffic demand of Mexico City, but the possibility to attract financial resources for 
an ecological restoration zone that was located nearby and a poverty-fighting solution to 
one of the most socially and economically depressed zones of Mexico City (Domínguez, 
2004:53-54). 
The results were also disastrous.  In reality, the development discourse publicised 
by  institutional  actors  was  accompanied  with  a  conception  of  ‘peasants’  that  were 
supposed to feel ‘fortunate’ for the long term benefits or that in any case did not have the 
capacity to oppose the project. This discourse however, was a solution for the project and 
not for the people in Atenco (following ideas of Schaffer, 1985).  In this way, the social 
and  historical  specificities  of  the  affected  communities  were  not  taken  into  account, 
creating discontent and frustration among them. A detailed analysis of public stances and 
interviews with leaders of the movement show that the source of grievance was not the 
expropriation per se, but a combination of two factors: a) the dismissed attempts to talk 
with the authorities before the public announcement of the project and b) the nature and 





V. SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND COLLECTIVE ACTION FRAMES 
  
Analysing the policy process from the State’s perspective, including the construction of 
democracy and development discourses only constitutes part of the story. There is a new 
distribution of political power and new channels of participation and representation have 
been  created.  This  necessitates  studying  new  actors  that  do  not  necessarily  belong  to 
formal institutions and yet, are capable of defining the outcomes of projects and public 
policies. These are contentious groups that mobilise and challenge the State even though 
they  have  limited  access  to  material  and  institutional  resources  and even  though  their 
chances  of  success  may  seem  non-existent.  After  all,  even  in  the  same  adverse 
circumstances, other projects have been implemented. Therefore, it is necessary to answer 
the following  questions:  What  conditions  and strategies  determined  the  success  of  the 
mobilisations  that  were  led  by  the  Frente  Popular  against  the  airport  project?  What 
conditions and strategies were determinant for the success of the mobilisations that were 
led by the Coordinadora against the privatisation of WSS in Cochabamba, Bolivia?  What 
were the main arguments, claims, and discourses to justify such social movements?  
  According to recent social movement theories in the area of Political Sociology, the 
emergence of a broad and vigorous social movement not only requires the existence of a 
grievance,  but  requires  that  potential  supporters  frame  grievances  in  wider  economic, 
socio-political, and historical contexts; interpret the surrounding events and construct a 
guide to action (Della Porta and Dani, 1999:68; Tarrow, 1992:177). They need to construct 
and deploy the pronouns ‘we’ –the challengers- and ‘they’ –the challenged, usually the 
State and its allies. It is necessary what Tarrow (1992; 1998) calls a collective action frame 
(CAF) or in other words, a discourse with the symbolic power to turn grievances into 
worthwhile reasons to mobilise (Della Porta y Dani, 1999:68). 
  For example, the Coordinadora was a loose collection of diverse organisations and 
its  discourse  or  collective  action  frame  played  a  paramount  role  for  providing  the 
movement with cohesion and sense of direction. The construction of a collective identity 
that  was  shared  by  rural  and  urban  groups  alike  was  not  trivial.  These  were  groups 
representing sectors of the population that a couple of years before had opposing interests 
in the midst of another water conflict: the conflict between urban and rural uses of water, 
staged in the context of the ‘war of the wells’ (Domínguez, 2006). Such a discourse was 
based on a very simple and yet powerful thought: the idea that water is a condition for the 
reproduction  of  life,  that  the  right  to  have  water  is  inalienable,  and  therefore,  that  its 
management concerns everybody (Grandydier, 18/08/05; López, 18/08/05). That is, the 
privatisation of WSS not only affected those who managed water sources in rural areas, 
but those paying higher fees in the city (Crespo, 11/08/05; Olivera; 12/08/05). 
In  this  way,  the  CAF  offers  causal  stories  that  contrast  with  those  offered  by 
institutional actors.  It fulfils the function of introducing new dimensions of conflict not 
considered originally or minimised during the policy process. But this does not mean that 
the CAF is a mere rhetorical device. In the case of the regantes in Cochabamba such idea 
is based on uses and customs, a set of complex rules and social arrangements to control the 
access to water, which in many cases go back to pre-Inca times. Beyond its normative 
functions, they actually embed a right that indigenous groups have historically earned to 
control a resource that is vital to preserve their conditions of social reproduction. In the 
case of urban groups, the cultural and historical value attached to water is more ambiguous 
and less visible. Only in the more economically and socially marginalised areas –like the 
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efforts undertaken during the last two decades to implement traditional systems that make 
up for the limited access to the water and sanitation network (Grandydier, 18/08/05).   
 The CG in Bolivia and the FPDT in Mexico offer similar examples. In the first 
case, the CAF was based on three discursive references that did not appear from one day to 
the  other:  a  historical-ideological  reference  that  situated  the  social  movement  in  the 
context of a longer struggle of the indigenous people against the unjust economic and 
political elite; a reference to the role that social movements have played during the process 
of  re-democratisation  in  Bolivia;  and    finally,  a  reference  to  an  ethno-nationalistic 
discourse that advocates radical changes to reduce the social and economic inequalities 
faced by indigenous groups in this country (Domínguez, 2005:11-12). Together these three 
references  provided  an  identity-umbrella  for  different  social  groups  and  introduced 
different value dimensions to the policy process: the most important, that any scheme for 
exploiting and monetising  the  reserves of  hydrocarbons in Bolivia  could  not be based 
exclusively on parameters of financial profitability and economic competitiveness, but on 
a radical redesign of the rules pertaining to the political and economic game.  
 On  a  different  scale,  the  movement  against  the  NIAMC  also  shows  that  the 
historical and social specificities of affected communities are crucial and may sometimes 
weight more than the project’s mere financial and economic assessment. In this case, the 
price  offered  for  the  necessary  land  to  build  the  new  airport  was  negligible  because 
according to existing laws that were outdated, the land should be valued according to its 
current use and not according to its future use (Ley de Expropiaciones, 1936). But the land 
in Atenco and Texcoco is labelled as agricultural land with a very low productivity, in 
many cases for auto-consumption. In this context and according to the policy discourse 
publicised by institutional actors (Section IV), peasants of these communities should feel 
fortunate regardless of the low prices: the airport was to be constructed on their land, 
triggering economic development in the region (Cerisola, 2001).   
The people in Atenco know that their land has very low productivity and it is often 
for self-consumption. However, this does not change that the value of the land is often a 
product of a cultural construction that may be incommensurable; that land symbolises a 
historical  fight  to  keep  a  space,  a  patrimony  that  is  transferred  from  generation  to 
generation and as studied by Castells (1983) in other areas of Mexico City, the basis for 
the  identity  formation  of  people  joining  urban  poor  movements.  In  a  few  words,  its 




VI. LATIN AMERICA AND THE PROBLEM OF THE ‘AUTISTIC’ STATE  
 
The different case studies illustrate how the policy process is much more complex and 
imperfect than usually assumed. Nevertheless, it is important to stress that such complexity 
and imperfection is inherent to the process itself and is not necessarily related to the ruling 
by any particular political party. That is, the same conditions –problematic preferences, 
partial understanding  of the overall  policy system, advocacy  coalitions, and  prevailing 
normative values- are faced one way or another by right wing presidents such as Vicente 
Fox in Mexico or left wing governments such as Lula da Silva in Brazil or Evo Morales in 
Bolivia. Moreover, such difficulties can also be found in the case of developed countries 
such as Germany or the United States.
8  
                                                
8 In fact, as mentioned in Section II, the John Kingdon’s multiple streams framework was originally 
thought  to  analyse  policy  process  in  different  policy  subsystems  in  the  United  States  such  as 
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The Latin American case is particularly interesting because many policy decisions, 
especially those taken in the context of windows of opportunity as described in Sections III 
and IV, are frequently based on a limited number of variables and evaluative dimensions.  
A  likely  hypothesis  is  that  given  the  complexity  of  new  democratic  settings  and  the 
domestic and international pressure faced by the State in Latin America, policy makers 
have been trapped in a sort of inertia left behind by authoritarian regimes –often military 
dictatorships-  that  preceded  democratic  transitions.  That  is,  reality  continues  to  be 
simplified,  assuming  that  all  decisions  can  be  taken  hierarchically,  with  a  top-down 
approach, pretending that the world is a chessboard where the subjects of development are 
turned into ‘clients’ or objects with limited or no agency over the policy process.  If this is 
the  case  then  the  authoritarian  State  has  maybe  been  replaced  by  the  ‘autistic’  state, 
defined by a set of institutions characterised by their continuous learning difficulties, its 
automated and one-dimensional reasoning, its lack of common sense, and in general, by its 
limited capacity to communicate with the outside world.   
 In  Cochabamba,  for  example,  the  institutional  efforts  to  justify  the  privatising 
trends in the water and sanitation sector were accompanied by two discursive practices. 
First, by the invalidation of other policy alternatives based on the idea of inevitability and 
second, by the annulment of popular participation based on the idea of institutionalisation 
–  i.e.  the  market  and  the  respective  regulator  constitute  the  only  valid  actors.  As  a 
consequence, the importance of uses and customs in rural areas and of traditional systems 
of water provision in the city were completely erased. This is not surprising if the only 
criteria to assess a public policy are the criteria of technical and economic efficiency.  
  At  the  same  time,  the  idea  that  popular  participation  was  only  legitimate  if 
channelled through institutional and/or formal channels such as the Civic Committee of 
Cochabamba prevailed throughout the design and implementation of the process to lease 
SEMAPA-MISICUNI.  But  being  institutional,  those  channels  were  aligned  with  the 
normative values that had prevailed all along the policy process (Domínguez, 2006). In a 
similar  fashion,  the  efforts  to  discuss  Law  2029  were  almost  non-existent  (Crespo, 
11/08/05). Moreover, it was an instrument promoted at the margin of ongoing discussions 
about a new water law and it was a result of strong pressure from international financial 
institutions.  
 In the case of the NIAMC, interviews with social movement leaders confirm that 
attempts to initiate a dialogue before the project was officially announced were blocked by 
the government’s dismissive and indifferent reactions. In every case, the answer was that 
the project’s final decision had not been taken yet or that it was premature to talk about the 
project  and/or  the  expropriations  before  these  were  announced  (Del  Valle,  08-2003; 
Arévalo, 08-2003).  To a great extent,  this attitude is caused  by two factors. First,  the 
importance that non-institutional channels of political participation and representation may 
have was systematically minimised. Second, democracy and development discourses were 
based on conceptions of social and political processes that were essentially incomplete. 
Hence,  once  the  decision  was  officially  announced,  the  character  of  the  expropriation 
decrees  created  a  perception  within  the  people  of  Atenco  and  Texcoco  that  the  Fox 
government was trying to deceive them (Domínguez, 2005:61-62). Likewise, the Pacific-
LNG project and the concession of SEMAPA-MISICUNI are also examples of how the 
inadequate management of a window of opportunity may bring about the perfect setting 
for constructing and diffusing a CAF to legitimate a social movement, portraying the State 
as an ‘enemy’ and framing a project or public policy in the context of broader social and 
economic grievances. 
 




VII. IMPLICATIONS FOR DEMOCRACY AND INEQUALITY 
 
 
Based on the analysis of previous sections, it is still necessary to explore the role that these 
social  movements  have  had  as  alternative  channels  of  political  participation  and 
representation. To a great extent, the answer depends on the theoretical framework that is 
used  to  analyse  and  measure  the  achievement  of  a  social  movement.  In  general  it  is 
possible  to  talk  about  three  big  areas:  the  democratization  of  the  public  space,  the 
introduction and discussion of new normative values and assessment criteria in the policy 
process,  and  the  securing  of  political  rights  and  material  demands.  A  movement  has 
effectively positioned itself as an alternative channel for political exchange between the 
State and civil society to the extent that it represents a genuine alternative to achieve any 
of these three goals.  
   The case studies illustrate how institutional actors in Latin America have often 
understood  the  processes  of  democratic  consolidation  from  an  elitist  standpoint,  often 
based on the narrow idea of electoral democracy. That is, consolidating democracy has 
been understood as part of a modernising task that should be led by political elites and that 
does  not  require  the  participation  of  popular  groups  beyond  the  periodical  election  of 
political representatives and the respect for the rule of law. The problem with this vision is 
that it creates a false dichotomy between the ‘masses’ and the ‘elites’, implicitly assuming 
that  these  latter  have  a  sort  of  ontological  superiority.  This  opens  the  door  to 
institutionalise undemocratic practices by political actors and to have democratic practices 
by  social  actors  that  are  legitimate  and  yet  remain  without  being  institutionalised. 
(Avritzer,  2002:29).  For  these  reasons,  the  processes  of  democratic  consolidation  can 
alternatively be conceived as centred on the democratisation of the public space (Cohen 
and Arato, 1997; Habermas (1989), cited in Avritzer, 2003: 39-41); on the consolidation of 
a  space  that  minimises  the  dichotomy  between  civil  society  and  political  society, 
strengthening the linkages between participation and public debate.  
   The CdA in Cochabamba constitutes the most illustrative example. Their leaders 
took advantage of the general discontent towards the institutions of political representation 
and offered an alternative space for public participation and discussion, at least throughout 
the conflict of 2000. After more than a decade since the transition to democracy, political 
parties had been incapable of representing the genuine interests of numerous sectors of the 
population. They were far from undertaking the necessary internal reforms after 1982 and 
from improving their relations with civil society. By contrast, traditional political parties 
had  a  mild  reaction  to  their  own  crisis  of  representation.  They  promoted  normative 
changes that had little implications for the system of representation and only delayed its 
own demise (Lazarte, 2005:185-186). Faced with this ‘representative void’, the meetings 
and assemblies that were organised by the Coordinadora became a space of participation 
and deliberation wherein the people could take decisions about a theme that interested 
everyone: the control over water.   
  Following  ‘new’  social  movement  theorists,
9  it  was  about  questioning  and 
redefining existing boundaries between the public, the political, and the private (Kitschelt, 
1993:15; Pichardo, 1997:414). The concession of SEMAPA-MISICUNI and the approval 
of new regulations in the water and sanitation sector were ‘the straw that broke the camel’s 
                                                
9 By contrast with other approaches to studying social movements, these theorists do not agree 
with an instrumental and strategic conception of social movements because they consider that 
constructing and projecting a collective identity should be considered as a goal on its own (Cohen 
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back’  and  warned  the  population  in  Cochabamba  about  the  importance  of  direct 
participation, in contrast with a model of representative democracy that had proven to be 
useless to bring their interests to the fore of public decisions (Domínguez, 2006). In the 
case  of  Cochabamba,  this  opening  of  public  space  was  also  conducive  to  project and 
diffuse  new  identities,  not  only  as  a  precondition  for  collective  action  but  through 
collective action.
10 As many ‘water warriors’ express it, the barricades, the marches and 
the blockades were spaces where people that had never seen each other before used to 
exchange and share personal experiences. And after realising that they were fighting for 
the  same  cause,  their  feelings  of  solidarity  were  strengthened  (interview  with  ‘water 
warrior’, 18/08/05). In the case of the FPDT in Mexico, the conflict contributed to diffuse 
collective  identities  grounded  in  the  importance  of  ‘solidarity  around  the  land’  and 
strengthened  the  self-conscience  that  many  communities  in  Atenco  and  Texcoco  have 
about their semi-urban character.  In this way, these social movements have contributed to 
transform and problematise the public space, offering alternative symbolic articulations 
that contrast to those that prevail in the policy process (Section IV). An airport does not 
only imply a policy solution for problems of aerial capacity, but the potential disruption of 
the  social  tissue  in  the  affected  communities;  the  concession  of  water  and  sanitation 
services is not only a matter of efficiency, but social justice; and the construction of a 
pipeline  is  not  only  a  way  to  export  and  monetise  natural  gas  reserves,  but  a  serious 
offence from a historical point of view.  
  Unfortunately, a greater democratisation of the public space has taken place at the 
expense  of  windows  of  opportunity  that  have  been  missed  to  implement  projects  and 
public policies that are still necessary. Part of this problem is derived from the relation 
between the publicised collective action frames and the deficient management of a window 
of  opportunity.  In  other  words,  when  social  and  historical  specificities  are  left  out  or 
minimised by policy makers, the CAF fulfils the function of accentuating identities and 
exaggerating  causal  stories  to  render  them  more  visible  in  the  public  space.    But  the 
boundary  between  exaggerating  and  radicalising  are  very  thin  and  therefore  social 
movement demands that are just –and justified- can easily become intransigent.  
 For  these  same  reasons,  the  contribution  of  these  social  groups  to  the 
democratisation  of  the  public  space  has  often  been  restricted  to  the  first  stages  of 
mobilisation. That is, social movements have often fulfilled the important task of catching 
the  attention  of  institutional  actors  and  public  opinion  regarding  the  existence  of  a 
problem, contributing to protect groups of citizens from arbitrary actions on behalf of the 
government –e.g. the expropriation of land at a negligible price or a disproportionate rise 
of water fees. No doubt, such ‘protection’ is essential for the processes of democratic 
consolidation (Tilly, 2000:4). Nevertheless, the contribution of these social movements has 
been very limited once it is necessary to reach a compromise, find points of agreement, or 
look for intermediate solutions. This is partly explained by the lack of confidence on State 
institutions, inherited from authoritarian or semi-authoritarian governments, but it is also 
partly explained by the nature of the collective action frames.  
 For  example,  in  the  case  of  the  opposition  against  the  NIAMC  the  social 
movement always sustained publicly that the land was not for sale at any price. Yet, many 
communities that had reached an agreement with the Federal Government expressed their 
disenchantment when the airport was cancelled and some confrontations between members 
and non-members of the FPDT have been registered thereafter. This suggests that behind 
the banners, the movement to oppose the airport project was not homogenous. There were 
                                                
10  Para  una  discusión  más  detallada  sobre  estas  diferencias en el  caso  de  Cochabamba, ver 
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those willing to sell the land if and only if the terms of negotiation were improved and 
those who maybe were not willing to sell it under any circumstance. In other words, during 
the first  mobilisation stages  the  social  movement  indeed compensated for  the  unequal 
access  to  channels  of  political  representation  and  participation,  but  eventually  the 
construction  of  more  radical  discourses  and  identities  blocked  the  expression  and 
materialisation of a more diverse set of interests. 
An additional argument against an elitist and electorate conception of democratic 
transformations  is  related  with  the  imperfections  inherent  to  the  policy  process,  as 
proposed throughout this work. In other words, if designing and implementing projects and 
public policies is characterised by scarce public deliberations then there is a greater chance 
to leave out relevant parameters and dimensions of conflict. This suggestion contrasts with 
Weber’s original idea about the incompatibility between popular sovereignty   and the 
complexity  of  public  administration  and  about  the  difficulty  to  establish  a  more 
participative public administration (Weber, 1978, cited in Avritzer, 2002:41). The idea 
proposed  here  is  that  precisely  because  the  policy  process  is  imperfect  it  should  be 
‘audited’ through the participation of a more diverse set of actors.  
 In this sense, the introduction of normative values and evaluative criteria on behalf 
of social movements should be analysed as part of the ideal connection between the public 
space and the political-administrative apparatus in charge of designing and implementing 
policy initiatives (Avritzer, 2003). The cases under analysis show that indeed these social 
movements  have  been  able,  one  way  or  another,  to  bring  back  normative  values  and 
dimensions  of  conflict  that  were  originally  not  considered  by  policy  makers:  the 
importance  of  uses  and  customs  and  alternative  systems  of  water  provision  in 
Cochabamba; the valuation of land as a physical and cultural space in the case of the 
NIAMC; and the redefinition of the political and economic rules of the game in the case of 
the ‘Gas War’. But again, as part of a broader process of democratising the public space, 
this  has  not  happened  without  missing  important  windows  of  opportunity.  The  only 
exception being maybe the case of the ‘Gas War’ in Bolivia where the true window of 
opportunity has been the high prices of hydrocarbons in the international markets, allowing 
for a higher level of royalties received by the Bolivian State. But in general, the outcome 
in Latin America is that important policy problems have been left unsolved.  
On the other side, the securing of political rights and material demands should be 
analysed  as  part  of  the  medium  and  long-term  effects  of  these  movements  on  the 
instrumentation  of  public  policy  and  on  the  processes  of  democratic  consolidation.  
Without doubt the policy initiatives here analysed have worked like ‘shocks’ that have 
triggered  or  accelerated  broader  processes  of  political  change  (Tilly,  2000:13). 
Nonetheless, the direction and magnitude of such changes depend on a complex set of 
factors such as the capacity of a democratic regime to absorb such shocks, the magnitude 
and significance of the respective project, and the capacity of a social movement to break 
existing decision-making monopolies or to block the consolidation of new ones. Regarding 
the conflict in Atenco and Texcoco, the democratic regime in Mexico was more able to 
absorb the cancellation of the airport project in comparison with the case of the ‘Water 
War’ or the ‘Gas War’ in Bolivia. In the first case, the policy window closed when the 
federal  government  reassessed  the  socio-political  dimensions  as  part  of  the  project’s 
integral evaluation and decided to cancel it. However, this did not open the door for the 
opposing  groups  to  break  into  the  decision-making  monopoly  of  communications  and 
transport and did not bring about any punctuation in the public policy equilibrium. In fact, 
beyond the cancellation of the project itself, the only visible effect on the instrumentation 
of new public policies was the approval of a new law of public goods that granted federal 
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during the expropriation of goods for public purposes (Kuri-Pérez, 10-2005; Ley de Bienes 
Nacionales, 2004).   
To  a  certain  extent,  the  limited  impact  of the FPDT  on  the  instrumentation  of 
public policies may be explained by the greater government capacity that the Mexican 
State  has  had  during  the  period  of  democratic  transition  as  opposed  to  the  Bolivian 
example. But other reasons may be mentioned. First, in the final stages of the conflict the 
FPDT radicalised in such a way that it lost the support from important institutional allies. 
And second, the people in Atenco and Texcoco lacked experience in dealing with issues 
pertaining to the policy area of transport infrastructure. At the end of the day, the conflict 
around the airport did not change the image of a policy subsystem whose problems are 
more technical than social and therefore  that should be managed  by a small group of 
technical professionals, away from public scrutiny (Baumgartner and Jones, 1991:1047). 
Beyond the policy stream, the final impact of this conflict on the processes of 
democratic  consolidation  in  Mexico  is  not  clear.  The  conditions  of  the  project’s 
cancellation  are  a  clear  sign  that  the  democratic  transition  has  brought  about  a 
redistribution of political power. At the same time, the experience projected by the FPDT 
may offer ‘repertoires of contention’ (Tilly, 1978) that may be used by other contentious 
groups in other circumstances. The experience of Atenco could be the beginning of a 
longer  term  ‘cycle  of  protest’  (Tarrow,  1994).  Ultimately,  the  contribution  of  new 
mobilisations and cycles of protest to the democratic consolidation will depend on the 
nature and on the specific circumstances surrounding them.  
The  case  of  the  ‘Water  War’  in  Bolivia  constitutes  the  opposite  example.  In 
general, the Bolivian State has shown less governmental capacity during the process of 
democratic transition. At the same time, a key for the success of the Coordinadora was 
precisely the support from experts and technical professionals that knew about water and 
sanitation in more detail and that complemented the physical resistance with technical, 
legal, and political arguments. Moreover, the policy subsystem of water and sanitation, 
headed by SEMAPA in Cochabamba, had never really been a policy monopoly that was 
completely closed. Since the 1970s, the representatives of its management board included 
municipal  authorities,  regional  authorities,  and  at  least  nominally  members  of  civil 
society.
11  
Additionally, the image of SEMAPA had deteriorated in the last decades in the 
context of serious  technical,  financial, and administrative problems (Pareja,  26-09-05). 
This negative image, reasserted by the failed concession process between 1999 and 2000, 
opened  the  opportunity  for  the  social  movement  to  have  a  more  active  role  in  the 
implementation of water and sanitation policies. Together, all these factors facilitated not 
only the expulsion of AdT and the cancellation of Law 2029, but the implementation of a 
new administrative model based on the idea of SEMAPA’s ‘social control’. Nevertheless, 
six years after the ‘Water War’ the fulfilment of the original material demands –i.e. a 
greater coverage and quality of water and sanitation service- has been almost nonexistent 
under the new social control scheme. Not surprisingly, the new decision makers have faced 
the same classical problems of the policy process: ambiguous preferences, power struggles 
between institutional actors, incomplete information, and conditionings that derived from 
prevailing normative values and assessment criteria. In fact, the experience of SEMAPA’s 
                                                
11 The president of the Civic Committee of Cochabamba was such civil society representative. 
Although this entity had been aligned with normative values promoted by institutional actors during 
the ‘Water War’, the mere presence of civil society actors in the management board of SEMAPA 
shows  that  this  subsystem  was  relatively  more  open  –or  relatively  easier  to  infiltrate-  in 
comparison,  for  example,  with  the  policy  subsystem  of  transport  and  communications  in  the 
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social control illustrates the extremes that the autistic State can take. On one hand, the 
‘Water War’ was a traumatic experience at different public and private levels of life in 
Cochabamba. In this sense, it is understandable that the social and political viability of 
certain policy alternatives has been reduced substantially. This is the case, for example, of 
any  private  participation  in  the  water  and  sanitation  sectors.    But  under  these 
circumstances  there  is  a  danger  of  falling  in  the  same  autism  that  characterised  the 
concession of SEMAPA-MISICUNI and the approval of Law 2029. That is, the danger of 
reducing  the  number  of  normative  values  and  dimensions  of  conflict  unnecessarily, 
constructing a new discourse of ‘inevitability’ around the experience of social control itself 
when  there might in fact be some  problems  of the water company and the water and 
sanitation sector in general that can’t be solve with such model (Domínguez, 2006). 
On  the  other  hand  –even  though  political  changes  in  the  Bolivian  case  have 
happened much faster-, the final impact of the ‘Water War’ and the ‘Gas War’ on the 
democratic consolidation of this country is also uncertain. As pointed out above, in the 
short term these conflicts contributed to diffusing new collective identities in the public 
space.  This  in  turn  has  contributed  to  the  promotion  of  political  movements  –most 
importantly  the  MAS-  which  eventually  attracted  a  majority  of  electors  that  was 
monopolised before by a limited number of traditional political parties, mainly the AND, 
the MIR, and the MNR.
12 In the medium term, both conflicts contributed to a longer cycle 
of  protests  that  was  triggered  by  profound  economic  and  political  reforms.  The  most 
important, no doubt, is the call for a Constituent Assembly, a process that happened rather 
late in contrast to other countries such as Colombia, Ecuador, and Venezuela (Van Cott, 
2005).  However,  the  Constituent  Assembly  is  an  ongoing  process  that  was  yet  not 
concluded when this article was finished.  
 
 
VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND RESEARCH AGENDA 
 
This work has explored some interrelations between policy processes and processes of 
social  mobilisation  in  Latin  America,  including  implications  for  the  democratic 
consolidation of the region. The object of study has been a series of conflicts that emerged 
in the post-electoral-transition era. These include the ‘Water War’ and the ‘Gas War’ in 
Bolivia and the conflict triggered by a project to build a new airport in Mexico City. The 
first two questions to answer are: why did government actors promote projects and public 
policies, even though not all the possible social and political difficulties were tied up?  
And second, what were the main official arguments, claims, and legitimacy discourses 
employed by the respective institutional actors in charge of promoting such projects and 
public policies? 
  According to the analysis here presented, the answer is rooted in the opening of 
windows of opportunity in the policy stream (Kingdon, 1984), together with the evaluation 
of  policy  initiatives  based  on  a  limited  number  of  normative  values  and  assessment 
criteria.  This  has  caused  the  minimisation  or  the  limited  consideration  of  important 
dimensions  of  conflict,  such  as  the  importance  of  uses  and  customs  in  Cochabamba, 
Bolivia or the value of land as a physical space in the Mexican case. The examples here 
presented suggest that, given the complexity of new democratic settings and the domestic 
and international pressures faced by the State in Latin America, policy decision makers 
have been trapped in a sort of inertia left behind by authoritarian regimes –often military 
                                                
12  In  fact,  the  current  president  Evo  Morales  and  his  political  party  (MAS)  gained  much  more 
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dictatorships- that preceded democratic transitions and that has evolved into the existence 
of ‘autistic’ States.  
   Under these circumstances, the policy process has provided the inputs necessary 
for constructing collective action frames (Snow and Benford, 1992; Tarrow, 1992; 1998), 
allowing social movements to be legitimated in the public space. Such collective action 
frames have been conducive to project new collective identities and causal stories that 
contrast with the policy discourses constructed by institutional actors. To a great extent, 
the success and/or trajectory of social movements depends on such identities and causal 
stories being sufficiently attractive to a broad set of potential followers.  
   At the same time, this work has aimed at assessing the role played by these social 
movements  as  alternative  channels  for  political  participation  and  representation.  The 
answer  depends on  the theoretical framework  that is used  to analyse  and measure the 
achievement of a social movement but in general it is possible to talk about three broad 
areas: the democratization of the public space, the introduction and discussion of new 
normative values and assessment criteria in the policy process, and the securing of political 
rights and material demands. Given the complexity of this kind of conflicts, it is risky to 
make  any  generalisation.  However,  the  analysed  examples  point  to  four  wide-ranging 
conclusions. 
   In the first place, these social movements have democratised the public space in 
two manners: by bringing back normative values and dimensions of conflict that were not 
originally considered and by diffusing a series of collective identities. Unfortunately, this 
has only been possible while missing windows of opportunity in the policy stream.  
In the second place, securing new political rights and material demands has been a 
function of three factors: the ability of democratic regimes to absorb ‘shocks’ derived from 
the  cancellation  of  important  policy  initiatives,  the  magnitude  and  significance  of  the 
respective  project,  and  the  capacity  of  a  social  movement  to  break  existing  decision-
making monopolies or to block the consolidation of new ones.  
In the third place, the few cases where the social movement has managed to earn 
the right of playing a more active role in the policy process, the results regarding the 
solution of policy problems have continued to be very limited. To a great extent, the new 
decision makers have faced the same classical problems of the policy process: ambiguous 
preferences,  power  struggles  between  institutional  actors,  incomplete  information,  and 
conditionings that derived from prevailing normative values and assessment criteria. 
  Fourth and finally, the impact of these movements in the longer term is at best 
uncertain.  In  countries  where  political  changes  have  happened  relatively  slowly  –e.g. 
Mexico-, the impact will depend on the emergence of longer cycles of protest (Tarrow, 
1994);  on  the  presence  of  new  contentious  groups  that  use  the  new  ‘repertories  of 
contention’ (Tilly, 1978) under different circumstances, and ultimately on whether new 
social movements promote democratic values or not. In countries where political changes 
have happened relatively faster –e.g. Bolivia-, the final result will depend on how new 
political and economic reforms are design and implemented.  
   Together, the examples presented show that any debate about development and 
public  policy  in  Latin  America  should  recognise  at  least  four  premises:  1)  the  policy 
process is imperfect, buy may benefit from the active participation of actors outside the 
State’s  institutional  apparatus,  including  those  not  using  institutional  channels  of 
participation  and  representation;  2)  the  plurality  of  actors  and  cognitive  experiences 
implies different visions of development; 3) traditional approaches to assess the technical 
and economic feasibility of a project should be complemented with qualitative parameters, 
including considerations regarding the social and historical experience of those who are 
directly affected; and 4) the timing of a project and the way it  is implemented, including QEH Working Paper Series – QEHWPS145  Page 23 
 
 
the respective discourse of legitimation, are as important or more important as its technical 
an financial feasibility.
13 
  These four guidelines and the analysis presented throughout this work should only 
be taken as a first attempt to articulate a broader vision of the relations between public 
policy,  social  movements,  and  democratisation in  Latin  America.  The  aim  was  not  to 
present an exhaustive conceptual framework, but to explore in a preliminary manner the 
ways in which social movement theories and policy theories may be combined to improve 
the design and implementation of public policies in the region, also contributing to the 
processes of democratic consolidation.  A more extensive work should include a more 
sophisticated analysis of other variables here proposed. Beyond windows of opportunity, 
policy monopolies, and collective action frame, it is also necessary to explore the potential 
role of different advocacy coalitions (Sabatier, 1988; 1999), organisational resources and 
mobilisation structures used by contentious groups,  and the role of potential movement 
allies (Tarrow, 1998).  
  In  more  practical  terms,  future  work  should  include  the  formulation  of  more 
detailed guidelines to face the different contradictions that emerge when studying together 
public  policy  process  and  social  movement  processes.  For  example,  it  is  necessary  to 
answer the following questions: How to implement participatory schemes in the context of 
windows of opportunity that close swiftly? How to link the public space with political-
administrative  apparatuses  without  having  public  policies  being  taken  over  by  narrow 
interest groups? How to conciliate the goals of economic efficiency and accommodation of 
legitimate social and political forces? How to continue implementing public policy in a 
context  of  deep  political  changes?  These  and  other  questions  constitute  the  central 
elements for a future research agenda.  
 
                                                
13 Interestingly, these four guidelines coincide broadly with recommendations derived from recent research 
works sponsored by international financial institutions like the Interamerican Development Bank. See for 
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